• Danino, G., Koren, M., & Madmon, O. "A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Ownership Restructuring in Privately Owned Assets". Accepted to the Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.

    Summary: We develop a practical, strategy-proof mechanism for resolving ownership deadlocks in contexts like joint ventures or supply chain partnerships, ensuring efficient and fair outcomes.

    Tools & Methodologies: Mechanism Design, Game Theory, Corporate Finance.

  • Koren, M. (2024). "The Gatekeeper Effect: The Implications of Pre-Screening, Self-Selection, and Bias for Hiring Processes". Management Science, (E-pub ahead of print).

    Summary: This paper analyzes how pre-screening stages ("gatekeepers") in hiring can paradoxically lower the average quality of the applicant pool by altering candidates' self-selection incentives and perpetuating historical biases.

    Tools & Methodologies: Game Theory, Algorithmic Screening, Information Design, Self-Selection Models.

  • Arieli, I., Koren, M., & Smorodinsky, R. (2024). "Information Aggregation in Large Collective Purchases". Economic Theory, 78(1), 295–345.

    Summary: This work examines how information from individual consumers is aggregated in settings like group buying or crowdfunding, analyzing the efficiency of collective decision-making under uncertainty.

    Tools & Methodologies: Information Aggregation, Game Theory, Collective Action.

  • Cohen, A., Deligkas, A., & Koren, M. (2023). "Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts". Theoretical Computer Science, 980, 114219.

    Summary: This research connects contract theory with machine learning by introducing algorithms that enable a principal to learn the optimal contract to offer an agent whose cost structure is initially unknown.

    Tools & Methodologies: Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Contract Theory, Machine Learning, Online Learning.

  • Arieli, I., Koren, M., & Smorodinsky, R. (2022). "The Implication of Pricing on Social Learning". Theoretical Economics, 17(4), 1761-1802.

    Summary: This paper investigates how a manager can use dynamic pricing as an operational lever to learn consumer demand, identifying conditions under which a firm can overcome informational herds and guarantee long-run learning.

    Tools & Methodologies: Social Learning, Game Theory, Dynamic Pricing, Information Design.

  • Koren, M., & Mueller-Frank, M. (2022). "The Welfare Costs of Informationally Efficient Prices". Games and Economic Behavior, 131, 186-196.

    Summary: We demonstrate a critical managerial tradeoff by showing that operational policies designed to be "informationally efficient" can paradoxically reduce short-term profitability and overall welfare.

    Tools & Methodologies: Information Economics, Game Theory, Market Efficiency.